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Abstract
We model and analyze strategic interaction over time in a duopoly.
Each period the rms independently and simultaneously take two se-
quential decisions. First, they decide whether or not to advertise, then
they set prices for goods which are imperfect substitutes.
Not only the own, but also the other rms past advertisement
e¤orts a¤ect the current sales potential of each rm. How much
of this potential materializes as immediate sales, depends on current
advertisement decisions. If both rms advertise, sales potentialturns
into demand, otherwise part of it evaporatesand does not materialize.
We determine feasible rewards and (subgame perfect) equilibria for
the limiting average reward criterion. Uniqueness of equilibrium is by
no means guaranteed, but Pareto e¢ ciency may serve very well as a
renement criterion for wide ranges of the advertisement costs.
JEL-codes: C72, C73, L13, M31, M37.
Keywords: advertising, externalities, average rewards, equilibria.
1 Introduction
We study strategic interaction over time in a duopolistic market in which
advertising causes di¤erent types of externalities in the time-dimension. For
this purpose, we design a game with joint frequency dependent stage payo¤s
which allows us to incorporate rather complex relationships, and analyze it
with modications of techniques traditionally used for innitely repeated
games. Each period the agents are engaged in Bertrand competition in a
strategic environment determined by their past advertising e¤orts and the
current advertising decisions, both taken as known for the pricing decision.
A strategy in this framework is a prescription, or game plan, for the entire
FELab & Department of Finance & Accounting, University of Twente, POB 217, 7500
AE Enschede, The Netherlands. Email: r.a.m.g.joosten@utwente.nl. I thank participants
in the EARIE conference in Ljubljana, 2009, and especially José Luis Maraga-González,
for comments and criticism.
1
innite time horizon consisting of advertising and pricing decisions for which
the intertemporal e¤ects of advertising e¤orts should be considered.
Each period is split up in two decision moments. First, both rms in-
dependently and simultaneously decide to advertise or not. Next, observing
these decisions they set their prices. If a rm decides to advertise, it pays
a feeat the beginning of the period for advertisement e¤orts during that
period. Hence, for the Bertrand competition phase the advertisement costs
can be regarded as sunk. We model this phase under the assumption that
consumption in a given period does not depend on the periods before, as
may very well be assumed for instance, for certain non-durable or perishable
goods.
Advertising has two e¤ects separated in the time dimension,1 it a¤ects
immediate sales directly and future sales in a cumulative manner (cf., e.g.,
Friedman [1983]) and we aim to capture both. With respect to the direct,
i.e., immediate or short-run, e¤ects, advertising increases the own immediate
sales given the action of the other rm. Advertising may also cause immedi-
ate externalities. Friedman [1983] distinguishes predatory and cooperative
advertising. An increase in advertising e¤orts of one rm leads to a sales
decrease of the other in the former type, to an increase in the second type of
advertising. In our model we incorporated features to allow representation
of both aspects concerning the short term e¤ects of advertising.
There is also an indirect, or cumulative, e¤ect of current advertisement
on future sales. To capture this feature, we introduce the notion of sales
potential varying in time under the decisions the rms have taken concerning
their past advertising e¤orts (see also Joosten [2009]). The current sales
potential of each rm is determined by its own but also by its opponents
past e¤orts. A higher e¤ort of either rm leads to an increase of the sales
potentials (ceteris paribus), but the impact of the own past e¤orts on the
own potential is always stronger than the impact of the opponents past
e¤orts. Advertising is therefore cooperative in its cumulative e¤ects on the
sales potentials.2 How much of these materialize as immediate sales, depends
on the current advertisement decisions.
The shapes of the current demand functions are determined roughlyby
past advertising, whereas present e¤orts x the demand functions in detail.
To be more specic, high past cumulative advertisement expenditures shift
the sales potential curves upward, high individual past expenditure make
the own demand less price elastic; asymmetric e¤orts lead to a tilt of the
same curves, making the more active rm less vulnerable to a price decrease
of the less active one. Current demand functions are then xed by the
advertisement actions in the rst decision moment of the stage and unless
1See also, e.g., Cellini & Lambertini [2003], Lambertini [2005], Cellini et al. [2008].
2José Luis Maraga-González advised us to emphasize here that the basic model is
general enough to deal with other scenarios as well.
2
both rms advertise a part of the potential is lost ceteris paribus.
In our dynamic deterministic duopolistic leaderless model of Bertrand
competition for non-durable incomplete substitutes, we restrict ourselves
to persuasive advertising with long and short run externalities on sales.3
We assume that the rms wish to maximize the average prots over an
innite time-horizon. We determine equilibria employing modications of
techniques traditionally used to analyze innitely repeated games. We nd,
as in the Folk Theorem for repeated games, that a continuum of rewards may
exist which can be supported by an equilibrium involving threats. Pareto
e¢ ciency seems a very useful criterion to reduce the abundance of equilibria
from this Folk Theorem, as for many parameter constellations, there exists
a unique Pareto e¢ cient equilibrium.
The critical reader may wonder why one would desire an additional model
given the a­ uence of advertising models. A major forte of our approach is its
generality as we only require continuity of the functions involved. Empirical
research should provide us with appropriate classes of dynamics and in that
sense we are ready to deal with almost anything that empirics will throw
at us. Furthermore, most empirical research takes measurements at certain
predetermined points in time. Since our methods deal with decisions, ac-
tions and changes in discrete time, a translation e¤ort into continuous time
for instance is quite unnecessary. An additional advantage of our type of
modeling is that it may serve as a vehicle of communication to large commu-
nities of economically inclined users who are not experts in the mathematical
discipline of optimal control theory or dynamic programming, the dominant
modes of analysis in di¤erential and di¤erence games.4
In an additional introductorysection, we relate our model to others in
the literature. Next, we proceed with a section to introduce the advertise-
ment model. Section 4 deals with strategies and rewards; Section 5 treats
threats and equilibria. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature and the positioning of our model
As mentioned, the games to be considered are games with joint frequency
dependent stage payo¤s, JFD-games for short, which generalize games with
frequency dependent stage payo¤s, or FD-games, introduced by Brenner &
Witt [2003], fully classied and analyzed in Joosten, Brenner & Witt [2003].
Such games can be classied as stochastic games or di¤erence games but we
are apprehensive to do so, because both classes of games are closely asso-
ciated to modeling traditions which are quite technically advanced and in-
volved.5 JFD-games however, have the advantage that certain intertemporal
3 If these terms are vague, please consult the literature section.
4Not to mention the didactic possibilities of our models.
5Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [1953]. Amir [2003] shows interesting
connections between di¤erence games and stochastic games in economic applications. The
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externalities can be modeled conveniently. We gained experience investigat-
ing a range of problems in which current decisions inuence payo¤s or other
relevant options in the future. We challenge(d) the virtual monopoly of dif-
ferential games in models on advertising (Joosten [2009]), the exploitation of
common (renewable) resource systems (Joosten [2007a,b,c,2010]), environ-
mental pollution (Joosten et al. [2003], Joosten [2004]), changing preferences
(Joosten et al. [2003]), and learning-by-doing (Joosten et al. [2003]).
Dorfman & Steiner [1954] examine the e¤ects of advertising in a static
monopoly and derive necessary conditions for the optimal level of adver-
tising. In a dynamic monopolistic model, Nerlove & Arrow [1962] treat
advertisement expenditures similar to investments in a durable good. This
durable good is called goodwill which is assumed to inuence current sales.
Historical investments in advertisement increase the stock of goodwill, but
simultaneously goodwill depreciates over time. Nerlove and Arrow derive
necessary conditions for optimal advertising, thus generalizing the Dorfman
and Steiner result. Friedman [1983] in turn generalizes the Nerlove-Arrow
model to allow oligopolistic competition in advertising and derives necessary
conditions for the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium (Nash [1951]).
Our notion of sales potential is quite close to goodwill in e.g., Nerlove
& Arrow [1962] and Friedman [1983]. The modeling of the changes in time
in the former model follows the work of Vidale & Wolfe [1957], though
the authors quote Waugh [1959] as a main source of inspiration. Vidale
& Wolfe [1957] present an interesting eld study giving empirical evidence
of the positive e¤ects of past advertising on current sales. Furthermore,
once advertising expenditures are stopped, current sales do not collapse, but
slowly deteriorate over time. Though Friedman quotes the work of Nerlove
and Arrow as a source for the notion of goodwill, his technical treatment of
the changes of the level of goodwill in time is inspired by Prescott [1973].
Economics has produced a large body of work on advertising. One
source of variety is the modeling of time-related aspects. For instance, is
the model static (e.g., Dorfman & Steiner [1954]), or is it dynamic in the
sense that the strategic environment may change (e.g., Nerlove & Arrow
[1962])? Another source of variety is the market under consideration, e.g.,
monopoly (Nerlove & Arrow [1962]), oligopoly (Friedman [1983]), leader-
follower oligopoly (Kydland [1977]). A third one is possible combinations
of advertising with other marketing instruments, e.g., Schmalensee [1978]
combines advertising and quality. A fourth is the entity to be inuenced
by advertising, for instance sales (e.g., Nerlove & Arrow [1962]) or market
shares (e.g., Fershtman [1984]). A fth is the strategic dimension in which
competition on the market is chosen, for instance Cournot (e.g., Joosten
origin of di¤erence games is not known to this author, but an inuential example is the
model of Levhari & Mirman [1980] on common pool resource exploitation. Continuous
time variants of di¤erence games are di¤erential games (see e.g., Dockner et al. [2000],
Jørgensen & Zaccour [2004], Engwerda [2005]).
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[2009]) or Bertrand competition (e.g., Cellini et al. [2008]).
Another dimension is based on the distinction by Nelson [1970] between
search and experience goods. The characteristics of the former kind are
known by-and-large before purchase, whereas those of the latter can be de-
termined only after purchase. Advertising di¤ers for the two types of goods
because the information conveyed to the consumers di¤ers. Informative
advertising provides information on e.g., the price, availability or character-
istics of a product; persuasive advertising tries to generate consumer interest
for a product, often by association or through rather indirect channels. An
example of persuasive advertising would be a famous athlete shown drinking
a certain beverage, or eating some kind of cereal. Credence goods (Darby &
Karni [1973]) can be regarded as an extreme type of experience good, as it
is hard to determine their characteristics even after purchase. The quality
of a certain brand of toothpaste can only be determined in the very long
run after a visit to a dentist. Informative advertising is directed at search
goods, persuasive advertising aims at experience or credence goods.
For dynamic optimal control models of advertisement Sethi [1977] per-
formed a Herculean task by coming up with a classication distinguishing
four types. The task may prove to be Sisyphean, as a more recent survey by
Feichtinger et al. [1994] already features six classes. Three new categories
were introduced, categories present in the earlier classication were renamed
and expanded, and merely one category survived in its original form. The
reader interested in di¤erential games on advertising is referred to Dockner
et al. [2000] and Jørgensen & Zaccour [2004].
3 The rules of the game
The advertisement game is played by two rms (players) A and B at dis-
crete moments in time called stages. Each stage the players independently
and simultaneously take two decisions sequentially. First the rms decide
whether to advertise or not; then, the rms set their prices knowing the ad-
vertisement decisions taken. The pricing decisions are assumed su¢ ciently
independent that there are no forward or backward consumption external-
ities in the time dimension. We have two types of externality e¤ects from
advertising, an immediate one and one which develops gradually in time.
We start by describing the Bertrand competition at a given stage assuming
past and current advertisement decisions to be known. Next, we treat im-
mediate externalities from advertising in the same stage, then we formalize
the externalities over time, and nally connect these e¤ects.
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3.1 A Bertrand stage game
We assume that at a given stage the two rms have the following demand
functions:
xk = Dk   a1kpk + a2kp:k; (1)
where k = A;B; and :k denotes not k. So, for instance, rm As demand
xA depends on the level of its own price pA, but also on pB; the price set by
the other rm. We take all parameters in (1) to be positive. This means that
the demand for rm A goes down if A increases its price, but goes up if rm
B increases its price. This implies that the goods produced by both rms
can be regarded as substitutes. The price spill-over e¤ects captured by a2k;
k = A;B; can not increase without bounds relative to the own price e¤ects
a1k; k = A;B; in this model. A condition which su¢ ces for the ensuing
analysis to make sense (technically speaking) is
a1k >
1
2
a2k for k = A;B: (2)
It should be noted however, that we can make do with a much weaker
condition which depends however, on the mutual spill-over e¤ects.
The agents wish to maximize their stage payo¤s using prices as strategic
variables while facing linear costs, i.e., we have costs equal to
ck(xk) = ckxk + c0;k for k = A;B:
with ck > 0 and c0;k  0 for k = A;B: Here, c0;k denotes the xed costs,
and ck the constant marginal costs for rm k:
The above means that the rms face the following rather standard max-
imization problems in the framework of Bertrand competition:
max
pk
pkxk   ckxk   c0;k for k = A;B: (3)
For the sake of easy reference, we introduce a notation for the parameter sets
dening the demand functions, i.e., (D; a) = (DA; DB; a1A; a2A; a1B; a2B):
Lemma 1 The Bertrand equilibrium (pA (D; a) ; p

B (D; a)) in the model de-
termined by Eq. (1)-(4) is given by
pk (D; a) =
2a1:k (Dk + cka1k) + a2k (D:k + c:ka1:k)
4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B for k = A;B:
The prot maximizing quantity sold for rm k = A;B; is then given by
xk (D; a) =
1
2
(Dk   cka1k) + a1ka2k (D:k + c:ka1:k)
4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B :
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Figure 1: Demand curves for both rms in Example 1 as an illustration of
Eq. (1). If both prices (denoted here by p(a) and p(b)) are zero, demand is
equal to 120, if rm A sets a price of 10, then its demand ranges from 0 to
40, whereas Bs demand ranges from 160 to 40, both for increasing p(b):
Finally, we can write down the prots for both players depending on the
parameters of the demand functions.
k (D; a) = p

k (D; a)x

k (D; a)  ck (xk (D; a)) ; k = A;B:
We will now give a fairly standard numerical example to compare it with
our expansions in the sequel.
Example 1 Let for k = A;B, the demand and the cost curves be given by
xk = 120  12pk + 4p:k;
ck(xk) = 3xk + 200:
Here, xk denotes the demand for rm k; given its own price pk and the price
of its competitor p:k: These demand curves are illustrated in Figure 1.
From Eq. (5) we derive the following specics for the reaction curves.
pk (p:k) =
156 + 4p:k
24
:
Figure 2 provides an illustration of these reaction curves. Lemma 1 yields
the Bertrand equilibrium:
(pA; p

B) = (7:8; 7:8) :
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This can be conveniently conrmed in Figure 2, as the Bertrand equilibrium
coincides with the intersection point of the reaction curves. The associated
(prot maximizing) sales are then given by
xA = x

B = 55:371:
The associated prot levels can be computed as being equal to
A = 

B = 65:783:
86420
8
6
4
2
0
p(A)
p(B)
Figure 2: The reaction curves in the price dimension for Example 1. The
intersection point is to be associated with a Bertrand equilibrium, i.e., prices
are mutual best-replies.
3.2 Immediate e¤ects of advertising
Now, we assume that there is an immediate e¤ect of advertising on the
demand functions of both rms. We choose the following notations
xj
A;jB
k = D
jA;jB
k   aj
A;jB
1k pk + a
jA;jB
2k p:k:
where jk 2 f1; 2g denotes the action regarding advertising chosen by player
k 2 fA;Bg in the same stage. So, there are four possible action combinations
depending on the advertisement decisions of the agents at the beginning of
the stage. We do not assume that the costs of production depend on the
advertising decisions of the agents, however, advertisement costs are not
assumed zero. Stated di¤erently, advertising decisions
 
jA; jB

induce
(D; a)j
A;jB = (Dj
A;jB
A ; D
jA;jB
B ; a
jA;jB
1A ; a
jA;jB
2A ; a
jA;jB
1B ; a
jA;jB
2B ):
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Figure 3: Timing each period. First the advertisement decisions are taken,
then the pricing decisions. For the latter phase the outcome of the rst is
known and the choices inuence the demand curves.
See Figure 3 for a graphic illustration of the timing issues involved.
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the shape of the demand curves
does not change qualitatively. More specically, the advertising decisions
shift these curves up or down without changing their slope. Hence, to make
sense in the present context we nd the following specications rather help-
ful. We assume that the relation between the various demand functions
under the advertising decisions is such that 1;1k  2;1k ; 1;2k  2;2k > 0 exist
satisfying
xj
A;jB
k
j
A;jB
k
=
x
ejA;ejB
k

ejA;ejB
k
for k = A;B; jA; jBejA;ejB 2 f1:2g : (4)
So, this will bring about the desired technical consequences with respect to
the demand functions. We would like to highlight the following convenient
property to be used in the remainder.
Lemma 2 Let (D; a) = (DA; DB; a1A; a2A; a1B; a2B) be given , let 4a1Aa1B 
a2Aa2B > 0 and (D0; a0) = (ADA; BDB; Aa1A; Aa2A; Ba1B; Ba2B):
Then pk (D
0; a0) = pk (D; a) and x

k (D
0; a0) = kxk (D; a) :
The lemma implies for the setting formulated the following.
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Corollary 1 Under the assumption formulated in Equation (4), Lemma 2
implies
pk (D; a)
jA;jB = pk (D; a)
ejA;ejB
k :
So, under all di¤erent specications the Bertrand equilibrium prices are iden-
tical. Hence, the optimal quantities and prot levels can be determined eas-
ily. Given advertising decisions
 
jA; jB

; advertisement costs ACA; ACB,
we have the following matrix game at the beginning of the stage24 1;1;A  ACA; 1;1;B  ACB 1;2;A  ACA; 1;2;B
2;1;A ; 
2;1;
B  ACB 2;2;A ; 2;2;B
35 ;
where, for instance, 1;1;A is a short-hand notation for 

A

(D; a)1;1

:
Example 2 Advertising is not for free and it is assumed that the advertise-
ment costs are xed and equal for both rms, i.e.,
ACA = ACB = 200:
We continue the example given before in the sense that we assume the
demand functions if neither rm advertises to be given by
x2;2k = 120  12pk + 4p:k; k = A;B:
With respect to the immediate e¤ects of advertising we assume that
x1;1k = 2x
2;2
k for k = A;B
x1;2A =
7
4x
2;2
A x
1;2
B =
5
4x
2;2
B
x2;1A =
5
4x
2;2
A x
2;1
B =
7
4x
2;2
B
It can be conrmed readily that for given price levels, total sales increase if
advertising e¤orts in the industry increase, i.e.,
x1;1A + x
1;1
B > x
1;2
A + x
1;2
B = x
2;1
A + x
2;1
B > x
2;2
A + x
2;2
B ;
where we omit the notations for the price levels. Moreover,
x1;1A > x
1;2
A > x
2;1
A > x
2;2
A and x
1;1
B > x
2;1
B > x
1;2
B > x
2;2
B ;
again ceteris paribus. Hence, own sales increase in own marketing e¤orts
but also in the marketing e¤orts of the competitor. In this sense advertising
in this example partially has a public good character (Fershtman [1984]).
In other words, there exists the following advertising externality: keeping
one players action xed, advertising of his opponent increases the formers
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sales as well. There are however, di¤erences as to which rm benets with
respect to sales more from advertising for asymmetricadvertising, i.e.,
x1;2A > x
1;2
B and x
2;1
B > x
2;1
A :
This means that the rm engaging in advertising has higher sales than the
inactive rm.
Lemma 2 allows us to write down the associated payo¤matrix easily as:24 1;1;A  ACA; 1;1;B  ACB 1;2;A  ACA; 1;2;B
2;1;A ; 
2;1;
B  ACB 2;2;A ; 2;2;B
35
=

331:56; 331:56 265:12; 332:23
332:23; 265:12 65:78; 65:78

Note that the stage game has two pure Nash equilibria, namely top-right
and bottom-left, hence in equilibrium precisely one rm advertises. The
rm advertising appropriates a greater share of the sales increase, but bears
all costs; the other rm benets moderately from its competitors e¤orts ab-
solutely for free. There is also a mixed Nash equilibrium in the stage game,
Pareto dominated by both pure ones.
3.3 Long term e¤ects, sales potentials
Another type of externalities accumulates gradually over time. We assume
that advertisement at any point in time has two e¤ects in the future. First,
the advertisement e¤orts have a cumulative e¤ect on the way the total mar-
ket increases and second, the rm showing more cumulative advertisement
e¤orts gets a larger share of this (potentially) expanded market. In order to
introduce these externalities, we need several notations.
Let hAt0 =
 
jA1 ; :::; j
A
t0 1

be the sequence of actions6 chosen by player A
until stage t0  2 and let hBt0 be dened similarly for the other player. Let
mn denote the set of real-numbered non-negative m  n-matrices such
that all components add up to unity, i.e.,
mn =
8<:z 2 Rmnjzij  0 for all i; j; and X
ij
zij = 1
9=; :
Let matrix U (i0; j0) 2 22 be dened by:
Uij(i
0; j0) =

1 if (i; j) = (i0; j0);
0 otherwise.
6References to the second phase actions omitted, rms set their Bertrand equilibrium
prices.
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Figure 4: The advertisement strategy is a game plan for the entire time-
horizon, the externalities arise because of the decisions along the play. The
pricing strategies are Bertrand equilibria, the stage advertisement decisions
are determined by the long term strategy.
Then, let q  0, and dene matrix t 2 22 recursively for t  t0 by
1 = e 2 22; and
t =
q + t  1
q + t
t 1 +
1
q + t
U
 
jAt 1; j
B
t 1

:
Taking q  0 moderates early e¤ects on the stage payo¤s. Recall that
jAt 1 denotes the action chosen by A at stage t   1. The interpretation of
this matrix is that entry ij of t approximatesthe relative frequency with
which action pair (i; j) was used before stage t  2; as it can be shown that
t =
q + 1
q + t
e+ t  1
q + t
U
 
hAt ; h
B
t

:
Here, U
 
hAt ; h
B
t

= 1t 1
Pt
k=2 U
 
jAk 1; j
B
k 1

for all t  2: Clearly, the inu-
ence of e and q disappears in the long run.
At stage t 2 N, the players have chosen action sequences hAt and hBt
inducing the matrix t: The latter determines the state in which the play
is at stage t:7 Observe that there exist four possible successor states to any
7Slightly more formal, we will denote the state at stage t 2 N by t from now on.
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state depending on the action pair chosen at stage t: Figure 4 visualizes the
externalities resulting from the di¤erent histories possible.
We assume that some of the parameters used in the previous subsection
to formalize the demand functions are indeed given for the maximization
problem at hand, i.e., at that stage, but vary over time depending on the
advertising behaviors of both rms in the past, i.e., before that stage, in the
following manner
(D; a)t = (D;A)(t):
So, given t; the sales potentials8 at stage t are given by
SP kt = Dk (t)  a1k (t) pk + a2k (t) p:k; k = A;B: (5)
where all the functions concerned are continuous functions from 22 to
R. The sales potential of a rm at a certain stage is inuenced by the
rms own advertisement e¤orts before, but also by the other players past
advertisement e¤orts. Own past e¤orts are always positive ceteris paribus,
i.e., the sales potential is always higher if the own advertisement e¤orts have
been higher in the past. Also, the own past e¤orts have a stronger impact on
the rms sales potential than the other rms have. This can be formalized
into the following set of restrictions:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@DA
@[t]11
; @DA@[t]12
; @DB@[t]11
; @DB@[t]21
 0;
@a1A
@[t]11
; @a1A@[t]12
; @a2A@[t]11
; @a2A@[t]12
 0;
@a1B
@[t]11
; @a1B@[t]21
; @a2B@[t]11
; @a2B@[t]21
 0:
We do not place stronger restrictions on the functions concerned in order
to guarantee the highest degree of generality. Sales potentials materialize
as demand whenever both rms advertise at the start of the stage game.
Otherwise, some potential will evaporate. We now show how the above can
be incorporated into an attractive model.
Example 3 Let, for given t; the sales potentials be given by (1), where
DA (t) = 240 + 80 ([t]11 + [t]12) (3 [t]11 + [t]12 + [t]21) ;
DB (t) = 240 + 80 ([t]11 + [t]21) (3 [t]11 + [t]12 + [t]21) ;
a1A (t) = 24  6 ([t]11 + [t]12) ;
a2A (t) = 8  4 ([t]11 + [t]21) ;
a1B (t) = 24  6 ([t]11 + [t]21) ;
a2B (t) = 8  4 ([t]11 + [t]12) :
8The term market potential was already taken for instance by Ziesemer [1994] or Fe-
ichtinger [1982], to name but a few. Ziesemer furthermore uses endogenous changes but
these come from di¤usion and learning processes as in Amable [1992] rather than adver-
tising decisions.
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Advertising raises the common part of the intercepts of the demand func-
tions for both rms in the same manner, i.e., 80 (3 [t]11 + [t]12 + [t]21),
rm A gets a shareof ([t]11 + [t]12) of this increase, whereas B gets a
shareof ([t]11 + [t]21) : So, the more often A has advertised in the past
the larger its shareis, now. The words share are in quotation marks, be-
cause they do not sum to unity. Note that there exist externalities as it
is for both rms benecial to coordinate on simultaneous advertising, i.e.,
keeping 3 [t]11+[t]12+[t]21 constant, the gain with respect to the positive
intercept is maximized by having [t]11 = 1.
Advertising does not only have an impact on the demand functions in the
sense that they move shift upward or downward. The parameters indicating
the slopes of the demand function in the own price (a1k) and the other price
(a2k) may change as well, hence the associated functions tilt. Note that
more intense own past advertisement e¤orts have been, the less the own de-
mand drops in case of an own price increase; the own demand su¤ers from
increased past advertisement e¤orts by the other rm.
Having explained how the sales potentials depend on past advertising be-
havior, we now link the sales potentials and the actual sales in the stage
game. First, the sales potentials are given by Eq. (5):
SP kt = Dk (t)  a1k (t) pk + a2k (t) p:k; k = A;B:
Each of the functions is specied above. The actual sales materializing from
the sales potentials depend on the current advertisement decisions as follows
x1;1A;t = 1  SPAt and x1;1B;t = 1  SPBt ;
x1;2A;t =
7
8
 SPAt and x1;2B;t =
5
8
 SPBt ;
x2;1A;t =
5
8
 SPAt and x2;1B;t =
7
8
 SPBt ;
x2;2A;t =
1
2
 SPAt and x2;2B;t =
1
2
 SPBt :
Hence, the total stage game sales are realized if both agents do advertise in
the stage game, otherwise some potential is lost, up to half evaporates in
case nobody advertises. By Lemma 2 we have the same Bertrand prices in
all four cases, and the associated demands are simple multiples as follows:
pk
 
D0; a0

= pk (D; a) and x

k
 
D0; a0

= kx

k (D; a) :
Please observe that the numerical examples treated in the preceding subsec-
tions can be recovered as a special case by setting [t]22 = 1:
4 Strategies and rewards
At stage t, both players know the current state and the history of play, i.e.,
the state visited and actions chosen at stage u < t denoted by
 
u; j
A
u ; j
B
u

:
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A strategy prescribes at all stages, for any state and history, a mixed action
to be used by a player. The sets of all strategies for A respectively B will
be denoted by XA respectively XB; and X  XA  XB: The payo¤ to
player k; k = A;B; at stage t; is stochastic and depends on the strategy-pair
(; ) 2 X ; the expected stage payo¤ is denoted by Rkt (; ) : In Figure
4 we have visualized the fact that the strategy determines the advertisement
decisions in the respective stages and that externalities are caused by these
decisions along the play.
The players receive an innite stream of stage payo¤s during the play,
and they are assumed to wish to maximize their average rewards. For a given
pair of strategies (; ) ; player ks average reward, k = A;B; is given by
k (; ) = lim infT!1 1T
PT
t=1R
k
t (; ) ;  (; ) 
 
A (; ) ; B (; )

.
It may be quite hard to determine the set of feasible (average) re-
wards F , directly. It is not uncommon in the analysis of repeated or sto-
chastic games to limit the scope of strategies on the one hand, and to focus
on rewards on the other. Here, we will do both, we focus on rewards from
strategies which are pure and jointly convergent. Then, we extend our analy-
sis to obtain more feasible rewards.
A strategy is pure, if at each stage a pure action is chosen, i.e., the
action is chosen with probability 1: The set of pure strategies for player k is
Pk, and P  PAPB: The strategy pair (; ) 2 X is jointly convergent
if and only if z; 2 mn exists such that for all " > 0 :
lim supt!1 Pr;
h#fjAu =i and jBu =jj 1utgt   z;ij   "i = 0 for all (i; j) 2 J:
where Pr; denotes the probability under strategy-pair (; ). J C de-
notes the set of jointly-convergent strategy pairs. Under a pair of jointly-
convergent strategies, the relative frequency of each action pair (i; j) 2 J
converges with probability 1 to z;ij in the terminology of Billingsley [1986,
p.274], i.e., this implies limt!1E;fU
 
hAt ; h
B
t
g = z;: However, this im-
plies also limt!1E;ftg = z;:
The set of jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards is given by
PJC  cl  x1; x2 2 R2j 9(;)2P\JC :  k (; ) ; k (; ) =  x1; x2	 ;
where cl S is the closure of the set S: For any pair of rewards in this set,
we can nd a pair of jointly-convergent pure strategies that yield rewards
arbitrarily close to the original pair of rewards.
The following result, illustrated in Figure 5, can be found in Joosten
et al. [2003] for FD-games. Related ideas were designed for the analysis
of repeated games with vanishing actions (cf., Joosten, Peters & Thuijs-
man [1995], Joosten [1996, 2005], Schoenmakers et al. [2002], Schoenmakers
[2004]). Let CPJC denote the convex hull of PJC :
Theorem 3 For any FD-game, we have PJC =
S
z2mn '(z): Moreover,
each pair of rewards in CPJC is feasible.
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Figure 5: The set of jointly-convergent pure strategy rewards resembles a
spearhead. The gure contains holes but the real set is dense. The Pareto-
e¢ cient equilibrium coincides with both rms always advertising .
From the formulation of Theorem 3 it may not be apparent, but an im-
plication is that PJC can be visualized rather elegantly. For this purpose,
several algorithms have been designed, involving the computation of a pair of
feasible rewards for a signicant number of frequency-matrices z 2 mn.
5 Equilibria
The strategy pair (; ) is an equilibrium, if no player can improve by
unilateral deviation, i.e., A (; )  A (; ) ; B (; )  B (; )
for all  2 XA;  2 XB: An equilibrium is called subgame perfect if for
each possible state and possible history (even unreached states and histo-
ries) the subsequent play corresponds to an equilibrium, i.e., no player can
improve by deviating unilaterally from then on.
In the construction of equilibria for repeated games, threatsplay an
important role. A threat species the conditions under which one player
will punish the other, as well as the subsequent measures. We call v = 
vA; vB

the threat point, where vA = min2XB max2XA A(; ); and
vB = min2XA max2XB B(; ): So, vA is the highest amount A can get
if B tries to minimize his average payo¤s. Under a pair of individually
rational rewards each player receives at least his threat-point reward.
To present the general idea of the result of Joosten et al. [2003] to come,
we adopt terms from Hart [1985], Forges [1986] and Aumann & Maschler
[1995]. First, there is a master planwhich is followed by each player as long
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as the other does too; then there are punishmentswhich come into e¤ect
if a deviation from the master plan occurs. The master plan is a sequence
of intra-play communicationsbetween the players, the purpose of which is
to decide by which equilibrium the play is to continue. The outcome of the
communication period is determined by a jointly controlled lottery, i.e., at
each stage of the communication period the players randomize with equal
probability on both actions; at the end of the communication period one
sequence of pairs of action choices materializes.
Detection of deviation from the master plan after the communication
period is easy as both players use pure actions on the equilibrium path from
then on. Deviation during the communication period by using an alternative
randomization on the actions is impossible to detect. However, it can be
shown that no alternative unilateral randomization yields a higher reward.
So, the outcome of the procedure is an equilibrium. For more details, we
refer to Joosten et al. [2003]. We restate here the major result which applies
to general games with frequency-dependent stage payo¤s as well as to JFD-
games.
Theorem 4 (Joosten, Brenner & Witt [2003]) Each pair of rewards in the
convex hull of all individually-rational pure-strategy rewards can be supported
by an equilibrium. Moreover, each pair of rewards in the convex hull of all
pure-strategy rewards giving each player strictly more than the threat-point
reward, can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The following is visualized in Figure 6 and illustrated in Example 4.
Corollary 5 Let E0 = f(x; y) 2 PJC j (x; y)  vg be the set of all individ-
ually rational jointly-convergent pure-strategy rewards. Then, each pair of
rewards in the convex hull of E0 can be supported by an equilibrium. More-
over, all rewards in E0 giving A strictly more than vA and B strictly more
than vB can be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In determining the set of jointly convergent pure strategy rewards and the
sets depending on it, we took Bertrand equilibrium pricing as behavior for
the stage game. To execute a threatthis need no longer hold, i.e., a player
may very well punish using a low price at each stage in addition to a long
term advertisement strategy in order to minimize his opponents rewards.
The following may serve as an example.
Example 4 It is quite di¢ cult to nd a threat point in general. Instead,
we will establish an upper bound for the threat point rewards. This implies
that all rewards above this upper bound can be supported by a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
We assume that rm A is to be punished by rm B and rm B simply sets
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a price and takes a long term advertising decision. Let therefore, pB = 4:95
and 11 = 21 = 0; then the long-run average prot of rm A is
A (12; pA) =
1
2
+
3
8
12
 
279:6 + 80212   (24  612)pA

(pA   3)  200  20012;
which can be motivated as follows. If rm A advertises it has stage prots
7
8
 
279:6 + 80212   (24  612)pA

(pA   3)  400;
whereas if it does not, it obtains
1
2
 
279:6 + 80212   (24  612)pA

(pA   3)  200:
The long-run frequency of the rst event is 12; the frequency of the second
one is 22 = 1   12: Note that in the rst event the costs are 200 higher
because the agent has to pay for the advertising e¤orts. Multiplying the
events prots with their relative frequencies, yields the average long run
prots.
Note that if rm A wishes to maximize the long-run average prots, it
may use both strategic variables 12; pA: We determine therefore the rst
derivatives of the long-run average prot function.
@A
@pA
=

1
2
+
3
8
12
 
279:6 + 80212   2(24  612)pA + 3(24  612)

;
@A
@12
=
3
8
 
279:6 + 80212   (24  612)pA

(pA   3)
+

7
8
12 +
1
2
(1  12)

(16012 + 6pA) (pA   3)  200:
Then, @
A
@pA
= 0 is equivalent to pA = 32 +
279:6+80212
48 1212 : Inserting the latter
in the formula for @
A
@12
and solving for @
A
@12
= 0 yields ve roots, two with
imaginary parts and three outside the range [0; 1] : So, an interior solution
to the maximization problem is not available. Taking the price of rm A to
the extremes does not make sense as both minimum and maximum prices
yield losses. Therefore, we must consider either 12 = 0 or 12 = 1: A
simple comparison yields that 12 = 1 yields highest prots 734:96, based
on computations pA = 11: 489 and xA = 133:70:
Note furthermore that rm Bs prot is
5
8
(167: 16) (4:95  3)  200 = 3: 726 3:
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So, rm B can indeed keep rm As long term stage payo¤s at at most 734:96
without the fear of going bankrupt, which lends considerable credibility to
this threat. This implies that rm As rewards can be kept below 734:96 as
well. Hence, we have shown that an upper bound for the threat point is
v = (734:96; 734:96) :
This in turn implies that all rewards yielding more than 734:96 for both
rms can be supported by an equilibrium (a subgame perfect equilibrium)
using threats (see Figure 6 for an illustration).
Figure 6: All rewards in PJC located to the north-eastof the two red lines
can be supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
We have formulated a new dynamic model of advertising in very general
terms. A broad variety of long and short term externalities can be modeled
by altering parameters. Long run advertising changes the height and shape
of each rms sales potential (function) in a rather gradual fashion. From
the sales potentials, the current demands are derived and the latter depend
on the current advertising decisions. If both rms advertise at that stage,
then their potentials will become their immediate demands, otherwise some
potential is lost and will not materialize in current demand.
Our analysis has considerable similarities with methods standard in the
study of repeated games. We regard this a major strength of the approach,
large sets of equilibria are relatively easily found and the variety of math-
ematical equations allowed is almost limitless as we only need a weak con-
tinuity assumption to validate them. Admittedly, a slight drawback of the
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approach is the familiar one connected to Folk Theorems, namely that there
are far too many equilibria.9 For this purpose, additional selection criteria,
such as Pareto-e¢ ciency10, might prove very useful. Equilibrium selection
is however, not a theme of this paper.
We have analyzed one example of the model rather completely. Ques-
tions may arise about the robustness of this example with respect to alter-
native specications. We have performed sensitivity analysis on all parame-
ters. The qualitative features of the set of jointly convergent pure strategy
rewards, so important for our analysis, are remarkably una¤ected by even
rather large changes. For one-parameter changes we mostly observed shifts
and expansions of the basic spearhead, but the shape of PJC remained
essentially the same. We did not perform a complete sensitivity analysis on
combinations of parameters, which is an arduous task.
The parameter with the most dramatic e¤ects turned out to be the
advertisement fee. For high values, only one equilibrium exists namely never
to advertise at all. For low advertisement costs, the unique Pareto e¢ cient
equilibrium is to advertise always, and a continuum of equilibria exists which
are not Pareto e¢ cient. For intermediate costs, a continuum of equilibria
exists and a continuum of Pareto e¢ cient equilibria exists. The latter range
of costs is extremely small relatively speaking.
An illustration of a case where the advertisement costs are considerably
above the value used throughout this paper is given in Figure 7. In the tail
of the sh shape, those rewards are to be found which result from strategies
which do not yield enough long-run externalities for the sales potentials
to expand su¢ ciently to justify incurring the advertisement fees. We have
established an upper bound for the threat point of approximately zero, hence
each reward in the positive orthant can be supported by a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Note that this implies that although the shape of PJC changes
considerably, the shape of the set of equilibria is not fundamentally di¤erent
from its shape for lower values of the advertisement fees.
In addition to a certain degree of robustness regarding parameters, we
may also report a robustness as to the specications of the market in the
stage games. In Joosten [2009], we investigated long term advertising with
numbers plausible from an assumption of Cournot competition. Further
research must bring a more complete picture as to what to expect under
di¤erent assumptions regarding competition in the stage games.
We have made concessions to reality to obtain results. We modeled
advertising as an either-or decision, not taking into account that various
9Opinions in the profession vary widely and wildly. Gintis [2001] for instance, dismisses
Folk Theorems as anything goes results. On the other hand, Osborne & Rubinstein [1994]
point out that Folk Theorems may yield considerable Pareto improvements compared to
innetely repeated one-shot Nash equilibria.
10Alternative selection criteria are advocated in e.g.,. Schelling [1960], Sugden [1995],
Janssen [1998, 2001]) or Güth et al. [1992].
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Figure 7: For increasing advertisement costs, PJC changes gradually into a
sh shape. Here, the advertisement costs are equal to 1500.
budgets might be attributed to it. However, our model is easily generalized
as any one-period budget in a nite range with a smallest monetary unit can
be modeled as a separate action. We refrained from doing so as the added
notational burdens seem hardly justied by additional insights.
Vidale & Wolfe [1957] described the interaction of advertising and sales
using a simple di¤erential equation in terms of three parameters, the sales
decay constant, the saturation level, and the response constant. Some of
the phenomena these parameters are meant to capture, are present in our
model, albeit implicitly. Further research must reveal whether such empir-
ical ndings can be approximated to a higher degree. The building blocks
of our model are easily adapted to accommodate input from empirics.
The class of (J)FD-games is rather new and the tools for analysis are
far from complete. Some results beyond the framework of this paper have
been established for environmental problems (Joosten [2004]) and so-called
Small Fish Wars (Joosten [2007a,b,c, 2010], Joosten & Meijboom [2010]).
Extending the model to allow an n-rm advertisement game is high on the
agenda.11 Large parts of the approach, most importantly Theorem 4, seem
generalizable, but a comprehensive formal generalization is still pending.
A crucial step in our approach is nding all jointly-convergent pure-
strategy rewards, another one is determining the threat point. For the rst
step continuity of the functions determining the average payo¤s on the rel-
evant domains of the stochastic variables involved, su¢ ces. Unfortunately,
there exists no general theory on (nding) threat points in FD-games, yet.
11Joosten [2010] also examines 3-person Fish Wars.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let (D; a) be given and to economize on notations, we
omit references to (D; a) as long as it seems harmless to do so. The maxi-
mization problems formulated in (4) yield the following rst-order condition
for a supremum :
0 = Dk   2a1kpk + a2kpk + cka1k for k = A;B:
The second-order conditions for a supremum are therefore easily fullled as
 2a1k < 0 for k = A;B:
From the rst-order conditions we derive the following reaction curves (omit-
ting references to the parameters):
pk (p:k) =
Dk + a2kp:k + cka1k
2a1k
; k = A;B:
Then, using the idea that a Bertrand equilibrium involves price strategies
which mutual best replies, we may state that the solution obeys the xed
point criterion pA = pA (pB (p

A)) yielding
pA = pA (pB (p

A)) =
DA + a2ApB (p

A) + cAa1A
2a1A
=
DA + a2A

DB+a2Bp

A+cBa1B
2a1B

+ cAa1A
2a1A
:
Pre-multiplying the rst and last parts of the above with 4a1Aa1B yields
4a1Aa1Bp

A = 2a1BDA + a2A (DB + a2Bp

A + cBa1B) + 2a1BcAa1A
= a2Aa2Bp

A + 2a1B (DA + cAa1A) + a2A (DB + cBa1B) :
Hence, (4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B) pA = 2a1B (DA + cAa1A) + a2A (DB + cBa1B) :
This gives the statement of the lemma for A under (2). The statement for
B can be veried similarly.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since
pk
 
D0; a0

=
2:ka1:k (kDk + ckka1k) + ka2k (:kD:k + c:k:ka1:k)
4Aa1ABa1B   Aa2ABa2B
=
AB (2a1:k (Dk + cka1k) + a2k (D:k + c:ka1:k))
AB (4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B)
=
2a1:k (Dk + cka1k) + a2k (D:k + c:ka1:k)
4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B = p

k (D; a) ;
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and
xk
 
D0; a0

=
1
2
(kDk   ckka1k) +
ka1kka2k (:kD:k + c:k:ka1:k)
4Aa1ABa1B   Aa2ABa2B
=
1
2
(kDk   ckka1k) +
ka1ka2k (D:k + c:ka1:k)
4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B
= k

1
2
(Dk   cka1k) + a1ka2k (D:k + c:ka1:k)
4a1Aa1B   a2Aa2B

= kx

k (D; a) ;
the statement of the lemma follows immediately.
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